AJC Briefing: Attack on Nahal Oz Oil Depot

Societal Suicidal Terror, Writ Large:
What the Attack on the Oil Depot at Nahal Oz Might Mean

Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs
April 9, 2008

Dr. Eran Lerman
Director, Israel/Middle East Office
American Jewish Committee

There are moments, even in the bizarre political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, when nothing seems to make sense anymore—unless “sense” is what we in our world would call utter senselessness. Today’s attack by four terrorists—apparently members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad—on the oil and gas depot near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, the one entry point for these vital supplies into the Gaza Strip, is one such moment. Two Israeli civilians, contract workers, were killed; rapid and effective response by soldiers and tanks in the area prevented further carnage and perhaps a planned abduction. Two of the attackers were killed immediately; the other two got back into Palestinian territory, but at least one may have been hit by an Israeli air attack on the vehicle that was waiting to pick them up.

This was clearly more than a run-of-the-mill terror action, and not only because such penetrations into Israel are relatively rare. The target, the timing, and the typical and total disregard for the real needs of their own people—all of these bear the markings of a strategic attack, aimed by PIJ and its Iranian masters to ensure that the Gaza Strip sinks ever deeper into the abyss. In a strange way, it is the attack that might finally put an end to what might be called “the anomaly of normality.” Amid the ongoing conflict, the drizzle of Qassam rockets falling on the northern Negev (albeit much reduced in recent weeks), and the more recent problem of sniper fire, which almost claimed the Israeli minister of internal security, Avi Dichter, when he toured the border fence, Israel was nevertheless engaged in a complex, ongoing (but indirect) attempt to reduce tensions with Hamas in Gaza. And, in addition, through various channels, Israel was seeking to negotiate for the release of Gilad Shalit. At the same time, the government, working through a private company, Dor Energy, continued to provide the population of Gaza not only with electricity from the Ashkelon power station (which is regularly shelled by the recipients of its own product), but also with oil and gas to sustain the population.

Terror may be blind, but even so, it cannot be quite as blind as not to realize what might happen now. The Israeli response is not entirely predictable: There may even be a benefit in trying to act as if nothing has happened, so as to demonstrate to the terrorists that they cannot set the agenda, in the midst of an intensive effort to revive the peace talks with Mahmoud Abbas’s government. But even so, it is difficult to imagine that civilians would be willing to show up tomorrow at the depot, operating it for the benefit of all Gazans. A major disruption is bound to occur, driving up the prices already made exorbitant by the habit of the Hamas authorities of appropriating some half of all oil imports for their own use. It must be the conclusion, then, that it is precisely such a disruption of life in Gaza, already on the verge of disaster, that the terrorists sought to achieve, deliberately to bring misery upon their own people.

Why do so?

• One possible reason would simply be to generate a chain of reactions and counter-reactions that would serve their political purpose—namely, at any cost, to delay or destroy the newly energized Israeli-Palestinian talks. Iran has a long history, going back to the mid-1990s, of doing just that through its proxies. Back then, it was largely their work that instigated the terror campaign that broke up the government of Shimon Peres and led to the rise of Binyamin Netanyahu to power. They may reckon this could happen again.

• There may also be an element of subversion aimed at the Hamas leadership itself, given that the latter did, in fact, reduce the level of attacks—not least, because they acutely felt the effects of the mini-war in March, and had lost some of their appetite for another large-scale Israeli operation. Still, they were reluctant to impose their will on PIJ, when the latter took the opportunity to upstage their bigger competitors, and thus Hamas must still bear full responsibility for what comes next.

They will again, in response, try to fall upon the tender sentiments of the world, as they did last time when Israel contemplated a limited reduction in energy supply. Indeed, a well-orchestrated and largely manipulative campaign, using the Western and Arab media as their foils, enabled Hamas to create a false image of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis and deterred Israeli decision-makers from using such tactics—until now. There may be people in Gaza who still believe that the free provision of Western gullibility—and Israeli generosity—is inexhaustible, come what may. But with this last act of bringing suicidal ruin upon their own society they just may have gone a step too far.

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